Intel
Published July 13, 2026 • 8 min read read

Key Insight

Seasonal businesses are not, as a category, unusually risky to buy. In SBA 7(a) records for loans approved between 2010 and 2017, they defaulted at 6.9% — barely above the 6.8% market baseline. The risk lives inside that average. Split by climate, the same seasonal businesses defaulted at 5.4% in cold-winter states and 9.7% in warm, sunny ones — nearly double. Split by balance sheet, asset-owning operators (land, equipment, recurring contracts) defaulted at 5.2%, while foot-traffic operators betting on a summer crowd defaulted at 9.0%. Franchised seasonal businesses failed at 10.8%, against 6.6% for independents. Stacked, the spread runs from 3.6% (established, asset-owning, cold-winter) to 11.5% (foot-traffic, warm, sunny) — roughly one in twenty-eight versus one in nine. Every one of those variables is knowable before signing. The instinct that a warm climate and a familiar brand make a seasonal business safer runs opposite to the survival data.

A word on scope

This analysis is built from SBA 7(a) loan-level records, restricted to SBA-financed businesses, using the seasoned cohort of loans approved in fiscal years 2010 through 2017 — old enough that the outcomes are settled rather than pending. Default is defined as a charge-off among resolved loans. As a validity check, the overall default rate in this cohort came to 6.8%, almost exactly the SBA's own published figure.

Two limits should frame everything below. The data captures only Main Street that runs through a bank; cash deals and seller-financed handshakes are absent. And the figures are correlational — they measure survival, not profitability, and some of the finer segments rest on a few thousand loans rather than tens of thousands. The directions are stable across cuts; the third decimal is not. Full sourcing is at the end.

Are seasonal businesses actually riskier to buy?

No. The standard caution against seasonal businesses — that the quiet months are where the cash runs out — does not survive the data. Pooling the classically seasonal industries (landscaping, garden centers, marinas, campgrounds, golf courses, ice-cream and snack stands, sporting-goods shops, florists) yields roughly fifteen thousand resolved loans defaulting at 6.9%, against a 6.8% market average. As a category, seasonality moves the outcome by a tenth of a point.

A flat average, though, conceals wide variation. The same fifteen thousand businesses diverge sharply once they are sorted by the factors set at the closing table.

Why do sunny-state seasonal businesses fail more often?

Because the constraint buyers are taught to avoid appears to function as a competitive moat. Sorted by winter severity, seasonal businesses in cold states defaulted at 5.4% — better than the market — while those in warm, sunny states defaulted at 9.7%, nearly double. The pattern holds within industries: landscapers failed at 4.5% in the north and 8.9% in the sun; frozen-treat shops at 6.1% in the cold and 11.9% in the heat.

SegmentDefault rate
Cold-winter seasonal5.4%
Market baseline (all SBA)6.8%
Seasonal (all states)6.9%
Warm-state seasonal9.7%

The obvious objection is that warm states simply defaulted more across the board in the recovery years. They did — by about two points across all businesses. But the seasonal gap exceeds four points, more than double the general effect, so it survives the all-business control. A plausible mechanism is competitive: where a season runs most of the year, entry is easy, the market floods, and price becomes the only lever left. A hard winter does the opposite work — it culls weak operators before spring and disciplines the survivors into hoarding cash. The finding is correlational, and climate here is a grouping of states rather than a measured variable, but the shape does not move when the obvious confounds are subtracted.

Does owning assets change the outcome?

More than climate does. Sorting the same businesses by what sits on the balance sheet separates them cleanly. Operators that own durable assets — land, equipment, a book of recurring contracts, as with campgrounds, golf courses, marinas, landscapers, and site-work crews — defaulted at 5.2%. Campgrounds and RV parks, sitting on appreciating land, defaulted at 2.7%, fewer than one in thirty. Operators that instead sell something discretionary to a summer crowd defaulted at 9.0%.

Balance-sheet typeDefault rate
Campgrounds / RV parks2.7%
Asset-owning seasonal5.2%
Foot-traffic seasonal9.0%
Ice-cream / frozen-treat stands9.3%
Sporting-goods shops9.8%

Same season, opposite outcomes. The dividing line is not whether a business is seasonal but whether it owns something durable or wagers on weather arriving on schedule.

Does a franchise brand reduce the risk?

The data indicates the reverse. Branded seasonal franchises defaulted at 10.8%; independent operators in the same industries defaulted at 6.6%. The brand nearly doubled the failure rate. A franchise fee is a fixed charge on every dollar of revenue, and a business with a short, concentrated earning window is precisely the kind least able to carry one. Buyers who pay a premium for the perceived safety of a name are, in the seasonal segment, paying it out of the margin they can least spare.

How do the factors stack?

They compound. The resilient profile — an established, asset-owning seasonal business in a cold-winter state — defaulted at 3.6%, roughly one in twenty-eight. The fragile profile — a foot-traffic business in a warm, sunny state — defaulted at 11.5%, about one in nine. Same lender, same loan program, a threefold difference in survival. The quieter variables lean the same way: established businesses defaulted at 5.2% against 9.9% for startups, and the longest-term notes at just 2.5%, partly because those are often real-estate-backed.

CPA
CPA Take
Much of what looks like bad luck in these outcomes was decided before the business opened. Location, asset base, brand structure, note length, and operating history are all set at the closing table and all knowable in advance. The survival data does not reveal a hidden risk so much as price the choices a buyer was in a position to make deliberately.

What the data can and cannot show

This is correlation, not a controlled experiment, and it should be held to that standard. The warm-state penalty could in principle reflect which industries or which buyers cluster in the sun rather than climate itself; it survives the all-business control and appears across industries, but "warm" and "cold" are groupings of states, not a thermometer. Part of the long-note advantage is simply collateral. And the deepest cuts — state-by-industry and the stacked combinations — run to a few thousand loans, so the direction is reliable while the exact figure is not. What the data does not support is any read in which sunshine, a franchise brand, or heavy foot traffic makes a seasonal acquisition safer.

The disciplined use of the signal is narrow but real. Financing survival and business appeal are distinct, and in the seasonal segment they point in opposite directions: the businesses that are easiest to picture owning — the busy boardwalk strip, the familiar franchise — cluster in the fragile profile, while the resilient ones tend to be the least photogenic. The variables that most move the outcome are all set before signing, which is where the analysis belongs.

Sources & method

The figures come from primary public data and are directionally solid rather than deal-level precise:

  • SBA 7(a) loan-level records — SBA-financed businesses only, seasoned cohort of loans approved FY2010–2017; default defined as charge-offs among resolved loans. The 6.8% overall baseline validates against the SBA's published figure.
  • "Seasonal" — a set of classically season-dependent industries defined by NAICS code.
  • "Warm" and "cold" — groupings of U.S. states by winter severity, defined for this analysis.

Figures are correlational and measure survival, not profitability. Some state-by-industry and stacked segments have smaller samples; the directions are stable across cuts, the decimals are not.

Author
Avery Hastings, CPA

Avery Hastings, CPA

Founder, Acquidex • CPA • Tokyo, Japan

Avery Hastings is a CPA based in Tokyo, Japan and the founder of Acquidex. She focuses on helping buyers evaluate small-business deals with clear cash-flow logic, realistic downside analysis, and practical diligence frameworks.

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